Specification
- Skill ID
- yaklang/hack-skills/hash-attack-techniques
- Publisher
- yaklang
- Repository
- hack-skills
- Installs
- 0
- Files
- 1
- Synced
- Sep 23, 2026
How to use it
Open any RiverX project, open the Skills panel in the chat, and search for this identifier. The files are fetched from the source repository at install time.
yaklang/hack-skills/hash-attack-techniquesInstalls these files- SKILL.md
What this skill tells the agent
SKILL: Hash Attack Techniques — Expert Cryptanalysis Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert hash attack techniques for CTF and security assessments. Covers length extension attacks, MD5/SHA1 collision generation, meet-in-the-middle hash attacks, HMAC timing side channels, birthday attacks, and proof-of-work solving. Base models often incorrectly apply length extension to HMAC or SHA-3, or fail to distinguish between identical-prefix and chosen-prefix collisions.
0. RELATED ROUTING
- rsa-attack-techniques when hash weaknesses affect RSA signature schemes
- symmetric-cipher-attacks when hash is used in key derivation
- classical-cipher-analysis when analyzing hash-like constructions in classical ciphers
Quick attack selection
| Scenario | Attack | Tool | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `H(secret \ | \ | msg)` known, extend message | Length extension | HashPump, hash_extender |
| Need two files with same MD5 | Identical-prefix collision | fastcoll | ||
| Need specific MD5 prefix match | Chosen-prefix collision | hashclash | ||
| Byte-by-byte HMAC comparison | Timing attack | Custom script | ||
| Find any collision | Birthday attack | O(2^(n/2)) | ||
| Proof of work: find hash with leading zeros | Brute force | hashcat, Python |
1. LENGTH EXTENSION ATTACK
1.1 Vulnerable vs Non-Vulnerable
| Hash | Vulnerable | Why |
|---|---|---|
| MD5 | Yes | Merkle-Damgard construction |
| SHA-1 | Yes | Merkle-Damgard construction |
| SHA-256 | Yes | Merkle-Damgard construction |
| SHA-512 | Yes | Merkle-Damgard construction |
| SHA-3 / Keccak | No | Sponge construction |
| HMAC-* | No | Double hashing prevents extension |
| SHA-256 truncated | No (if truncated) | Missing internal state bits |
| BLAKE2 | No | Different construction |
1.2 Attack Mechanism
Given: MAC = H(secret || original_message)
Known: original_message, len(secret), MAC value
Compute: H(secret || original_message || padding || extension)
WITHOUT knowing the secret!
How: The MAC value IS the internal hash state after processing
(secret || original_message || padding).
Initialize hash with this state, continue hashing extension.1.3 Padding Calculation (MD5/SHA)
def md5_padding(message_len_bytes):
"""Calculate MD5/SHA padding for given message length."""
bit_len = message_len_bytes * 8
# Pad with 0x80 + zeros until length ≡ 56 (mod 64)
padding = b'\x80'
padding += b'\x00' * ((55 - message_len_bytes) % 64)
# Append original length as 64-bit little-endian (MD5)
# or big-endian (SHA)
padding += bit_len.to_bytes(8, 'little') # MD5
# padding += bit_len.to_bytes(8, 'big') # SHA
return padding1.4 Tool Usage
# HashPump
hashpump -s "known_mac_hex" \
-d "original_data" \
-k 16 \ # secret length
-a "extension_data"
# Output: new_mac, new_data (original + padding + extension)
# hash_extender
hash_extender --data "original" \
--secret 16 \
--append "extension" \
--signature "known_mac_hex" \
--format md51.5 Python Implementation
import struct
def md5_extend(original_mac, original_data_len, secret_len, extension):
"""
Perform MD5 length extension attack.
original_mac: hex string of H(secret || original_data)
"""
# Parse MAC into MD5 internal state (4 × 32-bit words, little-endian)
h = struct.unpack('<4I', bytes.fromhex(original_mac))
# Calculate total length after padding
total_original = secret_len + original_data_len
padding = md5_padding(total_original)
forged_len = total_original + len(padding) + len(extension)
# Continue MD5 from saved state with extension
# (requires MD5 implementation that accepts initial state)
from hashlib import md5
# Most stdlib md5 doesn't expose state setting
# Use: hlextend library or custom MD5
import hlextend
sha = hlextend.new('md5')
new_hash = sha.extend(extension, original_data, secret_len,
original_mac)
new_data = sha.payload # includes original + padding + extension
return new_hash, new_data2. MD5 COLLISION ATTACKS
2.1 Identical-Prefix Collision (fastcoll)
Two messages with same prefix but different content, producing identical MD5.
# Generate collision pair
fastcoll -p prefix_file -o collision1.bin collision2.bin
# Result: MD5(collision1.bin) == MD5(collision2.bin)
# Files differ in exactly 128 bytes (two MD5 blocks)2.2 Chosen-Prefix Collision (hashclash)
Two messages with different chosen prefixes, appended with computed suffixes to collide.
# hashclash (Marc Stevens)
./hashclash prefix1.bin prefix2.bin
# Result: MD5(prefix1 || suffix1) == MD5(prefix2 || suffix2)2.3 UniColl (Single-Block Near-Collision)
Produces two messages differing in a single byte within one MD5 block, with same hash.
Application: forge two PDF/PE files with same MD5
- File 1: benign content
- File 2: malicious content
- Same MD5 hash2.4 Collision Applications
| Application | Technique | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Certificate forgery | Chosen-prefix | Rogue CA certificate (proven in 2008) |
| Binary substitution | Identical-prefix + conditional | Two executables, same MD5, different behavior |
| PDF collision | UniColl | Two PDFs showing different content |
| Git commit collision | Chosen-prefix (SHAttered for SHA1) | Two commits with same hash |
| CTF: bypass MD5 check | fastcoll | Two different inputs accepted as same |
2.5 CTF MD5 Collision Tricks
// PHP: md5($_GET['a']) == md5($_GET['b']) && $_GET['a'] != $_GET['b']
// Method 1: Array trick (not real collision)
?a[]=1&b[]=2 // md5(array) returns NULL, NULL == NULL
// Method 2: Real collision (fastcoll output, URL-encoded binary)
?a=<collision1_urlencoded>&b=<collision2_urlencoded>
// Method 3: 0e magic hashes (loose comparison ==)
// md5("240610708") = "0e462097431906509019562988736854"
// md5("QNKCDZO") = "0e830400451993494058024219903391"
// PHP: "0e..." == "0e..." is TRUE (both evaluate to 0 as floats)3. SHA-1 COLLISION
3.1 SHAttered Attack (2017)
First practical SHA-1 collision: two PDF files with same SHA-1.
- Complexity: ~2^63 SHA-1 computations
- Cost: ~$110K on GPU clusters (2017 prices)
- Tool: shattered.io provides the collision PDFs
3.2 SHA-1 Chosen-Prefix Collision (2020)
- Complexity: ~2^63.4 computations
- Practical for attacking PGP/GnuPG key servers
- Demonstrates SHA-1 is broken for collision resistance
3.3 Impact
SHA-1 should NOT be used for:
✗ Digital signatures
✗ Certificate fingerprints
✗ Git commit integrity (migration to SHA-256 in progress)
✗ Deduplication based on hash
SHA-1 is still OK for:
✓ HMAC-SHA1 (collision resistance not required)
✓ HKDF-SHA1 (PRF security suffices)
✓ Non-adversarial checksums4. BIRTHDAY ATTACK
4.1 Generic Birthday Bound
For n-bit hash: expected collisions after ~2^(n/2) hashes
Hash Bits Birthday bound
MD5 128 2^64
SHA-1 160 2^80
SHA-256 256 2^128
CTF application: if hash is truncated to k bits,
collision in ~2^(k/2) attempts4.2 Birthday Attack Implementation
import hashlib
import os
def birthday_attack(hash_func, output_bits, max_attempts=2**28):
"""Find collision for truncated hash."""
mask = (1 << output_bits) - 1
seen = {}
for _ in range(max_attempts):
msg = os.urandom(16)
h = int(hash_func(msg).hexdigest(), 16) & mask
if h in seen and seen[h] != msg:
return seen[h], msg # collision!
seen[h] = msg
return None
# Example: find collision for first 32 bits of SHA-256
result = birthday_attack(hashlib.sha256, 32)5. HMAC TIMING ATTACK
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