Specification
- Skill ID
- yaklang/hack-skills/ios-pentesting-tricks
- Publisher
- yaklang
- Repository
- hack-skills
- Installs
- 0
- Files
- 2
- Synced
- Sep 23, 2026
How to use it
Open any RiverX project, open the Skills panel in the chat, and search for this identifier. The files are fetched from the source repository at install time.
yaklang/hack-skills/ios-pentesting-tricksInstalls these files- IOS_RUNTIME_TRICKS.md
- SKILL.md
What this skill tells the agent
SKILL: iOS Pentesting Tricks — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert iOS application security testing techniques. Covers jailbreak vs non-jailbreak methodology, keychain extraction, URL scheme/Universal Links abuse, Frida/Objection runtime hooks, binary protection checks, and data storage analysis. Base models miss protection class nuances and AASA misconfiguration patterns.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- mobile-ssl-pinning-bypass for in-depth SSL pinning bypass (SecTrust hooks, SSL Kill Switch, framework-specific techniques)
- android-pentesting-tricks when also testing the Android version of the same app
- api-sec for backend API security testing once traffic is intercepted
Advanced Reference
Also load IOS_RUNTIME_TRICKS.md when you need:
- Frida recipes for iOS-specific hooks (ObjC class enumeration, method swizzling)
- Objection command reference for iOS
- Runtime hooking patterns and bypass templates
1. JAILBREAK VS NON-JAILBREAK TESTING
| Capability | Jailbroken | Non-Jailbroken |
|---|---|---|
| SSL pinning bypass | Frida, SSL Kill Switch 2, Objection | Network debugging proxy, MITM profiles (limited) |
| Keychain access | keychain-dumper, Frida dump | Only via backup extraction (limited) |
| Filesystem inspection | Full access to app sandbox | Only via ideviceinstaller + backup |
| Runtime manipulation | Frida, Cycript, LLDB attach | Frida on sideloaded apps (re-signed) |
| Binary analysis | Class-dump, Hopper on-device | Decrypt IPA on Mac, analyze offline |
| Method hooking | Full Frida/Cycript capability | Limited (needs re-signed app + Frida gadget) |
Non-Jailbreak Testing Setup
# Extract IPA from device
ideviceinstaller -l # List installed apps
ios-deploy --id <UDID> --download --bundle_id com.target.app
# Or use frida-ios-dump for decrypted IPA (jailbroken)
python dump.py com.target.app
# Sideload with Frida gadget (non-jailbreak runtime hooking)
# 1. Extract IPA, 2. Insert FridaGadget.dylib into Frameworks/
# 3. Re-sign with valid profile, 4. Install via ios-deploy2. KEYCHAIN EXTRACTION
2.1 Keychain Protection Classes
| Protection Class | Availability | Use Case | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked | Only when device unlocked | Passwords, tokens | Medium |
kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock | After first unlock until reboot | Background tokens | High (persists across locks) |
kSecAttrAccessibleAlways | Always (deprecated iOS 12+) | Legacy apps | Critical |
kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly | Passcode set + unlocked | High-value secrets | Low |
2.2 Extraction Methods
# Jailbroken: keychain-dumper
/path/to/keychain-dumper -a # Dump all accessible items
/path/to/keychain-dumper -g password # Generic passwords only
/path/to/keychain-dumper -i # Internet passwords
# Frida / Objection
objection -g com.target.app explore
> ios keychain dump
> ios keychain dump --json # JSON output for parsing
# Frida script for keychain enumeration
frida -U -f com.target.app -l keychain_dump.js2.3 What to Look For
| Item Type | Keychain Class | Typical Content |
|---|---|---|
kSecClassGenericPassword | genp | App tokens, API keys, user credentials |
kSecClassInternetPassword | inet | HTTP auth credentials, OAuth tokens |
kSecClassCertificate | cert | Client certificates |
kSecClassIdentity | idnt | Cert + private key pair |
kSecClassKey | keys | Encryption keys |
3. URL SCHEME HIJACKING
3.1 Custom URL Scheme Discovery
# From IPA/app bundle — check Info.plist
plutil -p /path/to/Payload/Target.app/Info.plist | grep -A 10 CFBundleURLTypes
# Example output:
# "CFBundleURLSchemes" => ["targetapp", "fb123456789"]3.2 Hijacking Attack
Scenario: Target app registers "targetapp://" for OAuth callback
1. Attacker app also registers "targetapp://" URL scheme
2. User initiates OAuth login in target app
3. OAuth provider redirects to targetapp://callback?code=AUTH_CODE
4. iOS may open attacker's app instead (non-deterministic scheme resolution)
5. Attacker captures OAuth authorization code| Attack Vector | Technique | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| OAuth callback interception | Register same scheme | Steal authorization codes |
| Deep link hijacking | Register same scheme | Phishing, data interception |
| Payment callback interception | Register payment scheme | Transaction manipulation |
3.3 URL Scheme vs Universal Links Security
| Feature | Custom URL Scheme | Universal Links |
|---|---|---|
| Registration | Any app can claim any scheme | Requires AASA file on domain |
| Uniqueness | Not guaranteed (multiple apps) | One app per domain path |
| Validation | None | Cryptographic (AASA signed) |
| Recommended for | Non-sensitive navigation | OAuth callbacks, sensitive actions |
| Hijackable | Yes (duplicate registration) | Only via AASA misconfiguration |
4. UNIVERSAL LINKS EXPLOITATION
4.1 AASA (Apple-App-Site-Association) Misconfiguration
# Fetch AASA file
curl -s "https://target.com/.well-known/apple-app-site-association" | jq .
curl -s "https://target.com/apple-app-site-association" | jq .
# Check for wildcard patterns (overly broad)
# Bad: "paths": ["*"] ← captures ALL URLs
# Bad: "paths": ["/NOT *"] ← poorly written exclusion| Misconfiguration | Risk | Exploitation |
|---|---|---|
Wildcard paths (*) | App claims all URLs on domain | Redirect chain may break UL → fallback to URL scheme |
| Missing AASA file | Universal Links won't work | App falls back to less-secure URL scheme |
| AASA on wrong domain | Links not associated | Scheme hijacking possible |
AASA not served as application/json | Parsing failure | Links won't associate |
| CDN caching stale AASA | Outdated associations | Inconsistent behavior |
4.2 Breaking Universal Links → URL Scheme Fallback
Technique: Force Universal Link to not open app, causing fallback to URL scheme
1. User long-presses link → "Open in Safari" (disables UL for that domain)
2. Redirect chain: domain A → domain B → target (UL breaks on redirect)
3. JavaScript redirect instead of 302 (UL only works on server-side redirects)
4. App not installed → URL scheme fallback → hijackable5. RUNTIME MANIPULATION
5.1 Frida on iOS
# Connect to app on jailbroken device
frida -U -f com.target.app --no-pause
# Basic ObjC exploration
> ObjC.classes # List all classes
> ObjC.classes.NSURLSession # Check if class exists
> ObjC.classes.AppDelegate.$methods # List methods
> ObjC.classes.AppDelegate['- isLoggedIn'].implementation # Read method
# Hook method and modify return value
Interceptor.attach(ObjC.classes.AuthManager['- isAuthenticated'].implementation, {
onLeave: function(retval) {
retval.replace(ptr(1)); // Force return TRUE
}
});5.2 Objection iOS Commands
objection -g com.target.app explore
# Keychain
> ios keychain dump
# Cookies
> ios cookies get
# Pasteboard
> ios pasteboard monitor
# Jailbreak detection bypass
> ios jailbreak disable
# SSL pinning bypass
> ios sslpinning disable
# Binary info
> ios info binary
# Hooking
> ios hooking watch class AppDelegate
> ios hooking watch method "-[AuthManager isAuthenticated]" --dump-args --dump-return
> ios hooking set return_value "-[AuthManager isJailbroken]" false5.3 Cycript (Legacy but Useful)
// Attach to running app
cycript -p com.target.app
// Explore UI hierarchy
UIApp.keyWindow.recursiveDescription().toString()
// Find view controllers
[UIWindow.keyWindow().rootViewController _printHierarchy].toString()
More from yaklang
Use this skill in a project
Open any RiverX project, search the Skills panel for yaklang/hack-skills/ios-pentesting-tricks, and install it in one click.
