Supabase Audit Auth Users
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities through various authentication endpoints.
- Skill ID
- yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills/supabase-audit-auth-users
- Publisher
- yoanbernabeu
- Repository
- supabase-pentest-skills
- Installs
- 0
- Files
- 1
- Synced
- Sep 23, 2026
Open any RiverX project, open the Skills panel in the chat, and search for this identifier. The files are fetched from the source repository at install time.
yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills/supabase-audit-auth-usersInstalls these files- SKILL.md
What this skill tells the agent
User Enumeration Audit
🔴 CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED You MUST write to context files AS YOU GO, not just at the end. - Write to.sb-pentest-context.jsonIMMEDIATELY after each endpoint tested - Log to.sb-pentest-audit.logBEFORE and AFTER each test - DO NOT wait until the skill completes to update files - If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.
This skill tests for user enumeration vulnerabilities in authentication flows.
When to Use This Skill
- To check if user existence can be detected
- To test login, signup, and recovery flows for information leakage
- As part of authentication security audit
- Before production deployment
Prerequisites
- Supabase URL and anon key available
- Auth endpoints accessible
What is User Enumeration?
User enumeration occurs when an application reveals whether a user account exists through:
| Vector | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Different error messages | "User not found" vs "Wrong password" |
| Response timing | Fast for non-existent, slow for existing |
| Response codes | 404 vs 401 |
| Signup response | "Email already registered" |
Why It Matters
| Risk | Impact |
|---|---|
| Targeted attacks | Attackers know valid accounts |
| Phishing | Confirm targets have accounts |
| Credential stuffing | Reduce attack scope |
| Privacy | Reveal user presence |
Tests Performed
| Endpoint | Test Method |
|---|---|
/auth/v1/signup | Try registering existing email |
/auth/v1/token | Try login with various emails |
/auth/v1/recover | Try password reset |
/auth/v1/otp | Try OTP for various emails |
Usage
Basic Enumeration Test
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilitiesTest Specific Endpoint
Test login endpoint for user enumerationOutput Format
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
USER ENUMERATION AUDIT
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Project: abc123def.supabase.co
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Signup Endpoint (/auth/v1/signup)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Test: POST with known existing email
Response for existing: "User already registered"
Response for new email: User object returned
Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE
The response clearly indicates if an email is registered.
Exploitation:curl -X POST https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/signup \ -H "apikey: [anon-key]" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email": "target@example.com", "password": "test123"}'
# If user exists: {"msg": "User already registered"}
# If new user: User created or confirmation needed
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Login Endpoint (/auth/v1/token)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Test: POST with different email scenarios
Existing email, wrong password:
├── Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
├── Time: 245ms
└── Code: 400
Non-existing email:
├── Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
├── Time: 52ms ← Significantly faster!
└── Code: 400
Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING
Although the error message is the same, the response
time is noticeably different:
├── Existing user: ~200-300ms (password hashing)
└── Non-existing: ~50-100ms (no hash check)
Timing Attack PoC:import requests import time
def check_user(email): start = time.time() requests.post( 'https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/token', params={'grant_type': 'password'}, json={'email': email, 'password': 'wrong'}, headers={'apikey': '[anon-key]'} ) elapsed = time.time() - start return elapsed > 0.15 # Threshold
exists = check_user('target@example.com')
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Password Recovery (/auth/v1/recover)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Test: POST recovery request for different emails
Existing email:
├── Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"}
├── Time: 1250ms (email actually sent)
└── Code: 200
Non-existing email:
├── Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"}
├── Time: 85ms ← Much faster (no email sent)
└── Code: 200
Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING
Same message, but timing reveals existence.
Existing users trigger actual email sending (~1s+).
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Magic Link / OTP (/auth/v1/otp)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Test: Request OTP for different emails
Existing email:
├── Response: {"message": "OTP sent"}
├── Time: 1180ms
└── Code: 200
Non-existing email:
├── Response: {"error": "User not found"}
├── Time: 95ms
└── Code: 400
Status: 🔴 P1 - DIRECTLY ENUMERABLE
The error message explicitly states user doesn't exist.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Summary
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Endpoints Tested: 4
Enumerable: 4 (100%)
Vulnerability Severity:
├── 🔴 P1: OTP endpoint (explicit message)
├── 🟠 P2: Signup endpoint (explicit message)
├── 🟠 P2: Login endpoint (timing attack)
└── 🟠 P2: Recovery endpoint (timing attack)
Overall User Enumeration Risk: HIGH
An attacker can determine if any email address
has an account in your application.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Mitigation Recommendations
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
1. CONSISTENT RESPONSES
Return identical messages for all scenarios:
"If an account exists, you will receive an email"
2. CONSISTENT TIMING
Add artificial delay to normalize response times:const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1000; // 1 second const start = Date.now(); // ... perform auth operation ... const elapsed = Date.now() - start; await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed) )); return response;
3. RATE LIMITING
Already enabled: 3/hour per IP
Consider per-email rate limiting too.
4. CAPTCHA
Add CAPTCHA for repeated attempts:
- After 3 failed logins
- For password recovery
- For signup
5. MONITORING
Alert on enumeration patterns:
- Many requests with different emails
- Sequential email patterns (user1@, user2@, ...)
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════Timing Analysis
The skill measures response times to detect timing-based enumeration:
Existing user:
├── Password hash verification: ~200-300ms
├── Email sending: ~1000-2000ms
└── Database lookup: ~5-20ms
Non-existing user:
├── No hash verification: 0ms
├── No email sending: 0ms
└── Database lookup: ~5-20ms (not found)Threshold detection:
- Difference > 100ms: Possible timing leak
- Difference > 500ms: Definite timing leak
Context Output
{
"user_enumeration": {
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T13:30:00Z",
"endpoints_tested": 4,
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
"severity": "P1",
"type": "explicit_message",
"existing_response": "OTP sent",
"missing_response": "User not found"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/signup",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "explicit_message",
"existing_response": "User already registered",
"missing_response": "User created"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "timing_attack",
"existing_time_ms": 245,
"missing_time_ms": 52
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/recover",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "timing_attack",More from yoanbernabeu
Use this skill in a project
Open any RiverX project, search the Skills panel for yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills/supabase-audit-auth-users, and install it in one click.
